[T]he model of the family provides an interesting contrast to the extreme liberal individualist picture. Love, or at least affection, not justice, is the first virtue of the family. Should mutual affection also be the first virtue of social and political institutions? This seems unlikely. However easy it might be to call everyone brother or sister, only a saint could act as if the entire human race (or even the residents of one’s street) made up a big, happy family, with the special ties of affection and concern that family members ideally have for each other.

(Jonathan Wolff, An Introduction to Political Philosophy, rev. ed. [New York: Oxford University Press, 2006], 196 [italics in original])

Note from KBJ: Wolff evades his own question! His question is whether mutual affection should be the first virtue of social and political institutions. His answer is that it can’t be. Perhaps he is making the following argument:

1. Mutual affection can’t be the first virtue of social and political institutions.

2. If mutual affection can’t be the first virtue of social and political institutions, then it’s not the case that it should be the first virtue of social and political institutions. (This is an instance of the “ought-implies-can” principle.)

Therefore,

3. It’s not the case that mutual affection should be the first virtue of social and political institutions.

The argument is valid and the second premise is true. Is the first premise true?