Let us consider, for a moment, whether accepting the value of liberty has any consequences for the question of distributive justice. How should a liberal society distribute property? Opinions differ widely. One tradition, following Locke, supposes that valuing liberty requires the recognition of very strong natural rights to property. In the libertarian development of this view—the most eloquent presentation of which is Anarchy, State, and Utopia, published in 1974 by the Harvard philosopher Robert Nozick (1938-2002)—these rights are so powerful that the government has no business interfering with them. The government in Nozick’s ‘minimal state’ has the duty to enforce individual property rights, but may not tax individuals beyond the level required for the defence of the citizens against each other and foreign aggressors. In particular, on this view, the state violates individual rights to property if it attempts to transfer property from some (the rich) to others (the poor). Distribution is to be left to the unimpeded free market, gifts, and voluntary charitable donations.
The libertarian, then, tries to argue from the value of the liberty of the individual to a very pure form of capitalism. In effect, this places an individual’s property within his or her ‘protected sphere’ of rights, where no one else, government or individual, may interfere without consent.
An opposing view points out that libertarianism is bound to lead to vast inequalities of property, which in turn will have a detrimental effect on the liberties—or at least the opportunities—of the poor. This view, welfare liberalism, argues that property must be redistributed from the wealthy to the less fortunate to ensure equal liberty for all. Property remains outside an individual’s protected sphere, and the government has the duty to supervise and intervene where necessary (subject to the laws of the land) to protect liberty and justice. The most important variant of welfare liberalism is contained in A Theory of Justice, published in 1971 (three years before Nozick’s book) by Nozick’s Harvard colleague, John Rawls (1921-2002). In fact much of contemporary political philosophy has been inspired by Rawls’s work, whether in defence of it, or, like Nozick, in opposition.
(Jonathan Wolff, An Introduction to Political Philosophy, rev. ed. [New York: Oxford University Press, 2006], 134-5)
Note from KBJ: Note the question-begging nature of the question, “How should a liberal society distribute property?” The question presupposes that property is not already “distributed,” i.e., that it is not already in the hands of individuals. It has somehow gotten into the hands of agents of the state, whose job it is to “distribute” it in accordance with some exogenously specified principle. Conservatives must resist this rhetorical sleight of hand. The appropriate question, to a conservative, is not how to distribute property but whether there is justification for unsettling or disrupting the existing distribution of property, which is presumed to be acceptable. To a conservative, the status quo needs no defense. What needs defense is its alteration.
Note 2 from KBJ: The expression “gifts, and voluntary charitable donations” is quadruply redundant! About all that’s missing is the word “free” in front of “gifts.”