Gregory S. Kavka (1947-1994) on Hobbes’s Rule Egoism
Whatever ultimate verdict is rendered on rule egoism as a viable moral system, viewing Hobbes as a rule egoist is surely necessary to enable us to understand what he is up to in his moral philosophy. His primary aim is to make the traditional moral virtues—justice, equity, and so on—attractive to his fellows, whom he views as (at best) predominant egoists. He points out that long-term and short-term interests do not always coincide and that, when reciprocation can be hoped for, practicing the traditional virtues is the best and most reliable way to maximize one’s long-term self-interest in an uncertain and perilous world of interpersonal interactions.
(Gregory S. Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986], 383)
Note from KBJ: Every normative ethical theorist is either a consequentialist or a deontologist, depending on whether he or she thinks that acts are to be evaluated solely in terms of their consequences. (Consequentialists do; deontologists don’t.) Every normative ethical theorist is either a progressive or a conservative, depending on whether he or she uses the theory to criticize or support commonsense morality. (Progressives use it to criticize, conservatives to support.) These distinctions cut across one another, creating four categories: (1) consequentialists who are progressives; (2) consequentialists who are conservatives; (3) deontologists who are progressives; and (4) deontologists who are conservatives. Exemplars of category 1 are Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, R. M. Hare, J. J. C. Smart, and Peter Singer. Exemplars of category 2 are Thomas Hobbes, David Hume, and Henry Sidgwick. Exemplars of category 3 are John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and Thomas Nagel. Exemplars of category 4 are Immanuel Kant, H. A. Prichard, and W. D. Ross. See here for elaboration.