7-26-87 I read an article last night on fetal rights. [Dawn E. Johnsen, “The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women’s Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection,” The Yale Law Journal 95 (January 1986): 599-625.] In almost every jurisdiction, if I punch a pregnant woman in the stomach and cause her to miscarry or deliver a defective child, I’m liable to the child for damages and probably also criminally liable. But what if the woman punches herself in the stomach? More realistically, what if she smokes, drinks, engages in dangerous activities, and does other things that endanger the health or life of the fetus? Recently, several states have enacted legislation attempting to deal with this problem. This legislation confers rights on fetuses. In one case, a court ordered a pregnant drug addict to stop using drugs. Other courts have ordered women to have blood transfusions (against their religiously grounded wishes) and undergo caesarean sections rather than vaginal birth (on grounds that the latter would jeopardize the child’s life). Although this article is legal rather than philosophical in nature, I found it interesting. Just what is the relationship between a pregnant female and her unborn child? What should it be? Is the fetus at her mercy until birth?

Radical feminist that I am, I have a particular perspective on these issues. If fetuses have legal rights, and if their interests diverge from those of their mothers, then some mothers can legitimately be coerced in order to protect their fetuses’ interests. That’s what it means to say that a fetus has rights. This is a haunting specter. I foresee male judges and prosecutors, for example, ordering women to refrain from certain activities (softball? bowling? running? vigorous sex?) in order to protect the interests of the fetus. Women could ultimately be captives of their reproductive capacities, mere baby-making machines. At some point we have to say “No.” We have to confer total control on the female until her child is born. And yet, we must leave open the possibility that women can abuse their fetuses and be held civilly or criminally liable for it. Given that a particular fetus is going to be born, why should its interests be accorded a second-class status? Why should a woman be civilly or criminally responsible for abusing her one-year old, but not her eight-month old fetus? As you can see, this is a complex and emotional subject. I hope to have more to say about it in future entries.

. . .

The 1987 Tour de France is over. Last [sic] year, it was won by an American, Greg LeMond. This year, it was won by an Irishman, Stephen Roche. I watched an hour-long special on the Tour this morning. According to the announcer, the course changes slightly each year. This year’s course was especially difficult, and I understand that it was hotter than usual in France, so Roche’s accomplishment is all the more significant. I’ve been following the Tour daily in the newspapers, and one of the things that I find interesting is how often the lead changes. There must have been ten different leaders this year, and from nearly as many countries. I also learned that there are climbers and sprinters. Roche is a sprinter, or flat rider, while his nearest competitor, Pedro Delgado of Spain, is a climber. Roche knew that if he could stay close to Delgado on the penultimate stage (through the mountains), he could win on the final day, which consisted of a 119-mile sprint [!] into Paris. I just can’t say enough about these riders. I admire them and think that they are the best athletes in the world. What a joy it would be to spend time with them, talking about bicycles and racing.