Twenty Years Ago
4-3-87 For many years now the maximum legal speed on any highway in this country has been fifty-five miles per hour. But yesterday the [United States] Senate overrode President [Ronald] Reagan’s veto of a highway bill, one part of which permits state legislatures to raise the speed limit to sixty-five miles per hour on rural portions of interstate highways. Here in Arizona, there’s not much doubt that the legislature will increase the speed limit. People in western states have been complaining for many years that the lower speed limit keeps them from getting around quickly without having much of an effect on safety. In the west, it’s possible to drive all day without seeing more than a dozen vehicles. Incidentally, President Reagan favors the higher speed limit; he vetoed the bill because it provides for over eighty million dollars of highway funding. Now we’ve got the funding and the possibility of higher speed limits.
Although I sympathize with those who drive for a living, such as truckers, I oppose raising the speed limit. Before, we had a uniform limit: fifty-five miles per hour. Now the limit will change as one drives from city to city on the interstate system. I’ve also seen studies which show that the lower speed limit saves lives. These are statistical deaths, to be sure, so many people tend to ignore them, but it’s as certain as statistics can be: If we raise the speed limit, more people will die. Finally, the argument that since people have been violating the fifty-five mile per hour speed limit anyway, we ought to raise it in order to make their behavior legal, is poor. People violate the law because they believe (quite reasonably, it seems) that they will not be ticketed. But there are limits. With a speed limit of fifty-five miles per hour, few people drive faster than sixty-five. Now, if the limit increases, we can expect speeds in excess of seventy miles per hour. That’s dangerous. Fortunately for me, I spend little time on interstate highways.
I collected term papers from my nine students this morning. Rather than begin lecturing on [Joel] Feinberg’s Social Philosophy [1973], as I had planned, I put Peter Singer’s famine argument on the board and spent the fifty-minute period discussing it. We’ve spent the entire semester on theoretical normative ethics, so I thought the students might appreciate some practical or applied normative ethics. They did. The discussion was lively. We examined each premise of Singer’s argument and concluded that, good or bad, it raises all manner of interesting issues, such as whether mere spatial or temporal proximity is a morally relevant consideration. I threw in my usual line about Singer having published this article at the age of twenty-five. “That should be a crime,” I chuckled. The students laughed.