What would “out” mean? At the moment, it would certainly mean a genocidal war of Balkan ferocity or worse within Iraq. That war would almost as certainly draw in both Iran and the Sunni powers of the region; if Iraq imploded, Iraqi Kurdistan would be severely tempted to declare its independence, perhaps in league with fellow Kurds in the adjacent areas of Turkey and Iran. And then, it seems almost certain, the entire region would explode, with incalculable political, economic, and human costs. In the midst of that chaos, al-Qaeda and similar networks would find themselves new Iraqi havens, as they did in the chaos of the Soviet debacle in Afghanistan—which would, in turn, likely mean that the United States would have to go back into Iraq in the future, under far, far worse circumstances than we face today.
The Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group, not otherwise notable for its strategic insight (indeed, most notable for its reiteration of the old shibboleths of “stability”), recognized this much, at least. And yet there are those who, for a variety of reasons—a misguided pacifism, despair over governmental ineptitude, Bush Derangement Syndrome, political calculation—insist that “we’re out” is the only answer. In truth, “we’re out” is the only answer that utterly fails to satisfy the ius post bellum, however one construes it. “We’re out” is contemptible, and it is dangerous.
(George Weigel, “Just War and Iraq Wars,” First Things [April 2007]: 14-20, at 19)