“But if everyone else did it, think what a mess there would be” seems on the face of it a utilitarian reason against doing something. Yet the philosopher with whose name we at once associate “universalisation” is Kant, whose Categorical Imperative is not intended to be an appeal to consequences of any kind (even though consequences creep into his examples). Utilitarians, however, from Hume onwards, have appealed to universalisation to defend their position against the “intuitionist” view represented in this century by Prichard and Ross. The special problem that interests me is whether the appeal to universalisation can consistently be made by a utilitarian, or whether, in some at least of its uses, it involves the acceptance of certain principles (e.g. “fairness”) without reference to their consequences.
The example of the duty to keep promises, which intuitionists treat as crucial in their controversy with utilitarians, will help to make the issue clear. Intuitionists maintain that the rule “promises ought to be kept” is known by direct inspection to be true (or, if you prefer it, “binding”) independently of any good or bad effects that its particular or general observance may have. Ross, as we have noted, escapes the paradoxical conclusion that all promises must be kept, even in the hardest cases, by resort to the doctrine of prima facie duties. In doing this he makes a concession to the element of utilitarianism present in unreflective “commonsense” (which, as a good Aristotelian, he always has in mind as a test of theory), without himself (he thinks) in any degree “going utilitarian”.
(A. K. Stout, “‘But Suppose Everyone Did the Same,’” The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 32 [May 1954]: 1-29, at 4-5 [footnote omitted])
Note from KBJ: The terminology of normative ethical theory has changed during the past century. Utilitarians are still known as utilitarians, but some theorists speak of “consequentialism” rather than “utilitarianism” in order to allow for other types of consequentialist theory besides utilitarianism. Intuitionism (with or without the epistemology) is now known as deontology, of which there are two types: moderate (e.g., Prichard and Ross) and absolutist (e.g., Kant). What interests me most about this passage by Stout is the idea that normative ethical theories are to be tested by common sense. There are two views about the purpose of theory. The first is that theory is a means to criticize and reform common sense. The second is that theory is a means to systematize and defend common sense. We may think of these views as progressive and conservative (respectively). The two distinctions cut across one another, producing four logically exclusive and exhaustive categories: (1) progressive consequentialists; (2) conservative consequentialists; (3) progressive deontologists; and (4) conservative deontologists. Kant, Prichard, Ross, and I are in category 4.