Richard Swinburne on Belief in God
What applies to beliefs generally applies to the belief that there is a God. Those who have that belief have a certain attitude towards the proposition or claim that there is a God, an attitude of setting it epistemologically above the alternative that there is no God, an attitude which has consequences for the believer’s behaviour. In the sense which I have been careful to distinguish, a man must act on his beliefs; he cannot have beliefs which could not in any circumstances make any conceivable difference to his conduct. One who really believes that there is a God will in some circumstances act differently from one who does not. If he seeks to tell the truth, he will say that there is a God. If he believes as well as that there is a God, that any God punishes the wicked, and if he seeks to avoid punishment, he will not be wicked. And so on. A man with the same purposes and the same other beliefs, would not do the same actions without the belief that there is a God. What are the consequences for action of a man’s belief that there is a God will depend crucially on which other beliefs he holds and what his purposes are. Thus suppose that he also believes that if there is a God, it is man’s duty to worship him; and he has the purpose of doing his duty, then he will worship. But he may believe that there is a God and yet not worship if he does not hold the other belief or does not have the purpose of doing his duty.
Whether a man believes that there is a God is something of which he is aware or of which he can become aware by asking himself whether or not he believes. However, a belief of this kind is of course one about which we may be rather more inclined to self-deception than about more mundane beliefs. We may want to believe, although really we do not, and so persuade ourselves that we do—or conversely, we may want not to believe, although really we do, and yet persuade ourselves that we do not. Clearly some vigilance is necessary here. Because of the possibility of a man deceiving himself about his religious beliefs, public criteria may sometimes show what are a man’s religious beliefs rather better than will his apparently honest avowal.
(Richard Swinburne, Faith and Reason [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981], 17-8)